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Abstract!:
It is well known that classical mechanics consists of several basic features like
determinism, reductionism, completeness of knowledge and mechanism. In this
article the basic assumptions which underlie those features are discussed. It is
shown that these basic assumptions - though universally assumed up to the
beginning of the 20th century  - are far from obvious. Finally it is shown that - to a
certain extent - there is nothing wrong in assuming these basic postulates. Rather,
the error lies in the epistemological absolutization of the theory, which was
considered as a mirroring of Nature.
Keywords: Perfect determination, determinism, mechanism, completeness,
mirroring, causality.
Introduction
Classical mechanics (CM) is one of the greatest achievements of human knowledge. It is a
compact building whose conceptual and mathematical aspects have been known and studied
in all details and consequences, though the formation of the theory itself was a difficult
process which took three centuries (the 17th to the 19th) to be completely achieved.
However, to the best of my knowledge, some basic postulates of CM have not been subjected
to a critical examination - a state of affairs that can be partly explained by the fact that some
of them have only been implicitly assumed. The consequence of this situation is that the basic
postulates of the theory have not yet been considered in their connection as a system - as is
the case for the formalism of the theory, which is presented in a systematic form from the
beginning of 19th century. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, there is still no handbook
which introduces these postulates in systematic order at the beginning of the exposition1.
The aim of this paper is to expose these assumptions in a systematic form and study their
relationships  rather than to analyse them in detail. In the next section, I shall examine CM's
determinism and the postulates from which it  stems. In the second section a similar analysis
is devoted to reductionism, while section 3 shows that mechanism is equivalent to
determinism plus reductionism. Section 4 examines the postulate of the completeness of
knowledge (and not that of the completeness of the theory itself, a problem which cannot be
posed in this form today). Sections 5-7 are devoted to the general consequences of these
assumptions while in section 8 some  concluding remarks will follow.
                                                 
1 See Landau/Lifshitz 1976, Goldstein 1950, Hestenes 1986, Knudsen/Hjort 1995, for
instance.
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1. Determinism
Everybody admits that CM is deterministic. But determinism is a complex assumption that
supposes other, more basic postulates or principles.
1.1 Omnimoda determinatio
The most basic assumption of CM is the postulate of perfect determination which may be
expressed as follows: All properties of a physical system are perfectly determined, where a
physical system can roughly understood to be an object or a collection of objects (somehow
interrelated) which can be (directly or indirectly) experienced, and a property can be roughly
considered to be the value which can be assigned to a physical variable or observable.
Perfectly determined means that each variable of the system has a definite value at all times.
This principle was always implicitly assumed. For all `classical' physicists it was so self-
evident that it was not even worth mentioning. In fact, modern physicists - like Galilei,
Newton, and many others - inherited it from ancient and middle-age philosophy: Democritus,
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Galilei, Kant, among others,
assumed that all properties of being are determined (the problem was obviously to determine
what the main or true being is). In fact, Kant says: All that exists is completely determined
[KANT 1763: 76; B: 599-602], which means that, between any possible predicate of an object
and its negation, one of the pairs must be actualised. Since every physical property can be
reduced to a binary form, i.e. using what in quantum mechanics are called projectors - for
example `being located in a certain space interval' or `being not located in a certain space
interval' -, then the philosophical definition is a generalization of the physical one and, so far
as physical objects are considered, they can be taken to be equivalent. For the following
examination Kant is an especially interesting example because it has often been said that his
philosophy is strictly related to Newtonian mechanics. The Latin traditional expression for the
complete determination is omnimoda determinatio and can be found, for example, in
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica [1739: § 148].2
Now it turns out that quantum mechanics may violate the omnimoda determinatio at least
through the superposition principle3: In fact, if a quantum system can be in a superposition
state, say of a wave localized in an arbitrary location 1 and of another wave in an arbitrary but
different location 2, then it is certainly impossible to say `either it is in location 1 or it is not'
or `either it is in the location 2 or it is not', or, more simply, `either it is in location 1 or it is in
location 2'. In this case, quantum mechanics would not acknowledge a generalized exclusion
disjunction4. There are no means to reduce such an indetermination to subjective ignorance. In
fact, superposition allows us to acquire objective information in the so-called interaction-free
measurements5: An object located in one arm of a Mach—Zender interferometer can be
detected even if no photon interacts with it, because its sole presence will change the
measurement outcomes by destroying the interference generated by the superposition.
Therefore, the indetermination due to the superposition principle should be taken as an
ontologically basic feature of the theory.
                                                 
2 On the problem see also Leibniz's letter to de Volder of april 1702 [PS: II, 239] and Wolff
[1731: §§ 105—118].
3 For argumentation on this point see chapters 24, 30 and 46 of Auletta 2000.
4 On this specific point see Hardegree1979.
5 See Elitzur/Vaidman 1993.
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1.2 Continuity
The omnimoda determinatio may be easily confused with determinism. But they are not
equivalent: In fact one can conceive a `classical' world where every  `state of the world'
(roughly: the complex of all states of all systems at a given instant) is in itself perfectly
determined though without relationship with past and future states, in the sense that the world
could jump from a state to another randomly. If this were the case, nobody could speak of a
deterministic evolution (for a more formal definition of determinism see the next subsection).
For this reason, in order to dynamically bound two successive states of the world or of a
physical system for the purpose of obtaining determinism, classical physicists also postulated
continuity. This assumption is known as the principle of continuity and it states that the
variables characterizing a physical system are supposed to be continuous, which in physics
means that, given two arbitrary possible values of a physical variable, all intermediate
possible real values are also allowed. For instance, if a body in motion is found at time t in
location 1 and at time t' in location 2, then in the time interval t' - t  it must have occupied all
the points that can be found in the trajectory that goes from 1 to 2. If we know that a body,
starting its motion from location 1, can reach location 2, then it must occupy at any instant of
time a point in  the trajectory defined by all the pertinent variables (momentum of the body,
forces acting on it, etc.).
The principle of continuity, though often not explicitly stated as such in handbooks, is widely
adopted and was already used from the early days of CM: One may remember here, for
example, the use of the principle made by Galilei in the law of fall6. Leibniz, in his
Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum (1692) [PS IV, 375-76],
applied this principle (or, in his words, the Lex continuitatis) to the problem of the passage of
a body from a state of motion to a state of rest.
It is true that a deterministic mechanics is conceivable which assumes the principle of perfect
determination but not the continuity. In this case, one should formulate some rules that take
the place of continuity and guarantee the necessary connection between present and future
(past) physical states by allowing predictions and retrodictions. However, it is an historical
fact that CM is founded on the continuity principle.
Obviously, the point of major conflict between CM and quantum mechanics was continuity.
This is rejected by the quantum postulate, which states that the values of quantum observables
can be discontinuous7.
1.3 Determinism
Sufficient conditions of determinism are the postulate of the perfect determination and the
principle of continuity. In fact, given the perfect determination of the state of a system at an
arbitrary initial time, if its dynamic variables (for example the energy) are continuous, then
every future state of the system will also be perfectly determined and unique, i.e. there are no
alternative possibilities or branching8. In fact, a possible deviation from the evolution line of
the world or of an isolated system would only be possible if there are new or different
properties relative to the initial state so that the system will go through an alternative
evolution. But the question is: Where do this modifications come from? Surely not from the
initial state itself (it would have incompatible properties, e.g. a position x and a position x')
                                                 
6 See Mach 1883: 130-131, 181 and 1905: 223.
7 The quantum postulate was assumed by Planck [1900a-b] and generalized by Bohr [1913].
8 One may think at Laplace's dictum that nothing is uncertain: See Cassirer 1957: 134-35 and
Earman 1986: 7. The latter book represent a good analysis of classical determinism.
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and not from a successive state too which can evolve from the initial state through a
continuous evolution (the new properties are here a dynamical consequence of the old
properties). On the other hand, we can exclude statistical fluctuations (statistics is only due to
subjective ignorance in classical mechanics). The only possibility is that these modifications
have been introduced abruptly by some violation of the continuity principle.
It is well known that a mathematical formulation of the assumption of determinism is given
by Hamilton's canonical equations. The Hamiltonian, the energy function of the system,
which is expressed as a function of the position and the momentum, fully describes the system
at every moment of its future (and past) evolution. Note, however, that determinism does not
coincide with predictability: In fact, it is well known that, for a large class of problems,
almost identical initial conditions can have very different solutions for later times [see also
subsection 2.2].
Determinism is an ancient philosophical concept too. It was probably introduced by ancient
atomism and further developed by ancient stoicism.
In quantum mechanics the Schrödinger equation is also deterministic, but here what evolves
deterministically are amplitudes (probabilities are square moduli of amplitudes in quantum
mechanics), i.e. it - paradoxically - represents a determinism that is intrinsically probabilistic.
In fact, in the general case, we cannot foresee what values the observables will have; we can
only write their probability distributions (ruled by the statistical algorithm).
As we have already said, the break of continuity is a major feature of quantum mechanics. For
this reason Bohr [1928; 1929] spoke of a break of determinism and of causality as such9. On a
strict physical plane and leaving aside the ontological features of the problem, which are too
complex to be analysed here10, causality may be here understood in a narrow and in a wide
sense, following the distinction between determinism and predictability. In fact, in a narrow
sense it may be taken as equivalent to determinism. In a wide sense it may be understood in
terms of predictability, and then it should rather be taken as equivalent to mechanism [see
section 3], to the extent in which linearity and separability are also necessary in order to have
a predictable future.
One could think that, besides perfect determination and continuity, determinism also supposes
conservation laws. We may understand the problem of conservation in two forms:
1. Nothing that is real can disappear;
2. in an isolated system certain  physical quantities such as angular momentum are
conserved.
We shall return on the second point later on [see subsection 4.1].
Point 1. is a general metaphysical statement and can perhaps be reformulated in physical
terms as a statement about the conservation of energy (which is obviously a conserved
quantity in the second  sense too): Mass is in fact equivalent to energy according to the
Einstein's well known law E = mc2 . In statement 1. it is the universe as a whole which is
considered as a closed system. It is then evident that this statement is a more basic one - but
also a weaker one - than statement 2. In fact, we could think of a world where there can be no
strict conservation of energy in the sense of statement 2. and notwithstanding would be
deterministic. For instance, there could be a universal but unknown and unknowable `ether' so
that all observable physical systems lose part of their energy. Then the energy would be
conserved in the sense of statement 1. because a form of energy is transformed into another
form of it by an interaction with the ether, but would not be conserved in the sense of
statement 2. because, for instance, we could have a physical law of this form:
                                                 
9 On this point see Tarozzi 1993.
10 See Swimburne 1983 and van Fraassen 1989.
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dp
dt
= F -ap , (1)
where F  is the force and a  some parameter. Obviously, the `path' or the `trajectory' of every
physical system should always be calculable, i.e. the loss of energy should follow strict laws
and not be random. Otherwise, the world could not be said to be deterministic. On the other
hand, as we have said, even if the `physics' in this universe was expressed in terms of
equations like the (1), the ether is not nothing, so that, in a certain objective (or meta-
physical) sense (God's point of view?), proposition 1. is also satisfied. But the difficulty of
this position is to admit the existence of something real that in principle cannot be
experienced.
2. Reductionism
Reductionism, as we shall see in what follows, is another basic piece of CM and, as
determinism, it presupposes other assumptions, which need to be preliminarily examined.
2.1 Materialism
One may wonder if the assumption of materialism is basic for CM since one may think that it
is a metaphysical assumption without consequence or relevance upon a physical science,
which CM is. But this is not the case: CM is a mechanical theory, i.e. a theory of the motion
of bodies and of the forces that act upon them. And a body is necessarily a material entity.
The existence and the basic properties of matter were assumed and defined already by
Galilei11  and Newton. In the third regula philosophandi of book III of the Principia [1687:
552-55], Newton wrote a list of properties of matter (bodies): Extension (a Cartesian
property), hardness, impenetrability, capacity to move, inertia12. Regarding hardness, Newton
[1704: 388-92] explained that the parts of all homogeneous hard bodies which fully touch one
another stick together very strongly. From their cohesion Newton inferred that particles attract
one another by some force, which in immediate contact is exceedingly strong. On the other
hand all bodies seem to be composed of hard particles; otherwise fluids such as water would
not freeze, or fluids such as «spirit of nitre and mercury» would not become hard «by
dissolving the mercury and evaporating the flegma». Therefore hardness can be considered to
be the property of all uncompound matter. It is then evident that all fluids can be reduced to
hard bodies by freezing or evaporating: In the latter case, in my opinion, the particles cohere
fully, which in turn means that some bodies are not hard only because they are rarefied to a
certain extent, i.e. there is some vacuum between the particles13. In other words, following
Newton, all matter can be reduced to some ground `state' in which it is fully homogeneous
(without empty space within) and hence inelastic. In fact elasticity is possible only if there is
some internal structure of the matter or some forces within, and both possibilities are
excluded by the homogeneity postulated here14.
One may discuss - and Newton himself had no final position on this point15 - if matter is a
continuous medium divisible in infinitum or if it is composed by elementary corpuscles that
                                                 
11 See Cassirer 1906: II, 387-89. See also Mach 1883: 248-49 and Hall 1954: 106-107.
12 See chapter 7 of Koyré 1957 for commentary.
13 An important difference in respect to Descartes [see Koyré 1968: 33-34, 105-110].
14 In Kant 1756 [486-87] elasticity depends on the interplay between attractive and repulsive
forces acting in matter. As we shall see, Newton excludes the existence of forces in matter.
15 See the mentioned regula III.
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are strongly bound and fixed together by adhering to each other. In fact, both positions
present difficulties: If matter is actually divided in infinitum, then it seems to lose its
consistency [see Kant 1756: 479]; but if matter is constituted of hard elementary particles,
then it is difficult to obtain a full homogeneity because there would be, almost certainly,
empty space. In fact, there are few shapes of elements which allow a composition of
macroscopic bodies without some emptiness: For example, it is well known that, for a plane, a
solution is represented by hexagonal symmetry (honeycomb) - but no system of hexagones
can enclose space. For three-dimensional space a solution is represented by the
tetrakaidekahedron, a fourteen-sided figure introduced by Lord Kelvin, or by a combination
of irregular polyhedra (14-hedron, 13-hedron, and 15-hedron) [THOMPSON 1942: 88-131,
157-59]. However, if I understand Newton well, even in the case where we have a minimum
of empty space, such a structure would be rigid. Now, if we assume full homogeneity, in the
case of a collision between two bodies of equal mass moving at the same speed from opposite
directions, they will coalesce at the point of collision (because they are fully inelastic)16. One
may say that the kinetic energy has been transformed into some activity of the particles
composing the body, but this is impossible because there is no internal structure and no
possibility for the particles to translate, to rotate or vibrate relative to one another17.
Obviously, one could say that full homogeneity can only be ascribed to elementary particles
constituting macroscopic bodies. But, in this case, elementary particles and macroscopic
bodies would act differently in the case of collision, which would be a major difficulty and in
conflict with the reductionistic methodology of CM. Note that Newton himself drew [1704:
398] the above conclusion about collision: «…by reason of the tenacity of the fluids, and
attrition of their parts, and the weakness of elasticity in solids, motion is much more apt to be
lost than got, and is always upon the decay. For bodies which are either absolutely hard, or so
oft as to be void of elasticity, will not  rebound from one other. Impenetrability makes them
only stop. If two equal bodies meet directly in vacuo, they will by the laws of motion stop
where they meet, and lose all their motion, and remain in rest, unless they be elastic, and
receive new motion from their spring».
In a general way, note that Newton had not included force as an intrinsic property of matter as
such - i.e. forces can only act  ‘from outside’ upon the matter. In fact, Newton only attributes
an inertia18 to the matter and  says [1704: 397-98] that it «is a passive principle by which
bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it,
and resist as much as they are resisted. By this principle alone there never could have been
any motion in the world. Some other principle was necessary for putting bodies into motion;
and now they are in motion, some other principle is necessary for conserving the motion. For
from the various composition of two motions, 'tis very certain that there is not always the
same quantity of motion in the world. […] it appears that motion may be got or lost».
Therefore, Newton concludes [1704: 401-403] by saying that it seems to him that «these
particles [of matter] have not only a vis inertiæ … but also that they are moved by certain
active principles, such as is that of gravity, and that which causes fermentation, and the
cohesion of bodies». Newton then considers these principles as «general Laws of Nature» and
says that «by the help of these principles, all material things seem to have been composed of
the hard and solid particles above-mention'd, variously associated to the first Creation by the
Counsel of an intelligent Agent. For it became him who created them to set them in order.
[…] blind fate could never make all the planets move one and the same way in orbs
                                                 
16 For examination see the chapter 9 of Koyré 1957.
17 For all the problem of bodies' collision see Mach 1883 [310-31].
18 Newton speaks of vis inertiæ but, as it is clear from that what follows, he means what we
call inertia today.
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concentrick … Such a wonderful uniformity in the planetary system must be allowed the
effect of choice». These and the uniformities of living beings «can be the effect of nothing
else than the Wisdom and Skill of a powerful ever-living Agent, who being in all Places, is
more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless uniform Sensorium, and
thereby to form and reform the parts of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts
of our own bodies».
As it is clear, these principles are due to the direct action of God19. As regards the force which
guarantees the cohesion of the bodies, Newton speaks [1687: 764--65] «de spiritu quodam
subtilissimo corpora crassa pervadente, et in iisdem latente; cuius vi et actionibus particul\ae
corporum ad minimas distantias se mutuo attrahunt, et contiguæ factæ cohærent». Therefore,
one can understand that Leibniz, who introduced the concepts of force and kinetic energy
against the Cartesian mechanism20, in his letter to the Princess of Wales [PS: VII, 352] felt the
necessity to defend the conservation law of «force and energy» against Newton. It is
interesting that, in his first answer, Clark writes [Leibniz PS: VII, 354] that God «not only
composes or puts things together, but is himself the Author and continual Preserver of their
original forces and moving powers».
Therefore, we clearly see that materialism, i.e. the supposition of a fully homogeneous and
inert matter, assumed since the early days of CM is far from obvious, and in fact this idea was
very soon abandoned21, but without a deeply critical examination. I think this is due to the
divorce between physics and philosophy which was already a reality a generation after
Newton and Leibniz (Kant himself was rather an exception). In quantum mechanics there can
be no question of perfectly hard and localized corpuscles: Quantum entities intrinsically
present a wave-like behavior or some fuzziness. Therefore it is better to speak of extended
particles22. On the other hand, a property like impenetrability seems inadequate to quantum
entities, which are able to tunnel.
2.2 Linearity
Linearity is an important property of classical systems as they were understood before the end
of XIX century, in particular before Poincaré's contribution. In itself it is essentially a
mathematical property, because it consists in the requirement that the basic equations of CM
must be linear, i.e. reducible to a form like
  a
0 (x) yn + a1 (x)yn-1 +K an (x) y = f (x) , (2)
where   a
0 (x), a1(x),K an(x) are coefficients, f (x)  is some function and yn  the n -th derivative
of y . But linearity has a conceptual relevance to the extent in which it excludes feed-back, i.e.
self-increasing processes.
Linearity allows an important aspect of the ‘reductionistic methodology’ of CM: The
factorisation between component ‘elements’ of a system, for example the decomposition of
motion in components by Galilei, the decomposition of forces by Newton or the
decomposition of harmonic components23. In other words if the cause (the force) C1  produces
                                                 
19 On this point see chapters 7-8 of Koyré 1957.
20 See the "Brevis Demonstratio Erroris Mirabilis Cartesii et aliorum" (1686) [MS VI, 117-23]
and the "Systeme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances" (1695) [PS
IV, 477-87.
21 As we have seen, for instance, by Kant.
22 On this point see chapters 30 and 33 of Auletta 2000.
23 For these examples see Mach 1883 [144-45, 191-92].
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the effect (the acceleration) E1  and the cause (the force) C2  the effect (the acceleration) E2 ,
then C1 + C2 produces E1 + E2 . This principle is often called the principle of (classical)
superposition.
One could think that in CM  a small perturbation on a given system or the weak interaction of
this with another system only causes a small deviation in the trajectory of the system in the
phase space, so that the system will normally ‘absorb’ it and return to the ancient
deterministic path. But a perfect classical system - as it is currently known - can show such a
dependence on the initial conditions that its evolution can be chaotic (in fact in a chaotic
regime this dependence is expressed by a strong divergence of initially very close and
indistinguishable trajectories in phase space). Note that, in the chaos theory, chaos itself is
intrinsic and deterministic and not stochastic and extrinsic - in other words, it is not due to
random fluctuations of the environment or to noise24. In fact there can be also chaos with
Hamiltonian systems.  Chaos and complexity are possible when the requirement of linearity is
abandoned. In this case we have feed-back. Roughly: An output of the system becomes an
input. But even though CM had already abandoned linearity at the beginning of the 20th
century, it further defended reductionism - as we shall discuss in subsection 2.4.
Linearity is not violated by quantum mechanics. In fact the Schrödinger equation is linear,
and any attempt to introduce non-linear terms in this equation has failed up to now25. In
general, it could be said that the principle of superposition of states guarantees linearity in
quantum mechanics in a stronger form than in CM.
2.3 Separability
Separability is another key feature of CM. But it is again an implicit assumption, and was
stated explicitly, by Einstein and his co-workers [Einstein et al. 1935], not before 1935, as
CM was confronted with quantum mechanics. The principle of separability may be expressed
in the following way: Given two non-interacting physical systems, all their physical
properties are separately determined, or, in other terms, the result of a measurement on one
system cannot depend on a measurement performed on the other system. The meaning of the
principle is the following: Two systems can be interdependent only through a physical
interaction (for example some form of potential energy).
Again quantum mechanics seems to violate the separability principle due to a consequence of
the superposition principle for multiparticle systems: Entanglement. In fact, for entangled
subsystems it is not possible to factorise the probabilities of the outcomes of experiments
performed on each subsystem locally. In other words, probabilities calculated on one of two
‘distant’ subsystems, even if they do not physically interact, are not independent26.
                                                 
24 On this point see Schuster 1988 and Ruelle 1989.
25 A non-linear equation for quantum mechanics was proposed in Bialynicki-Birula/Mycielski,
1976. Shimony proposed [1979] an experiment  aiming to verify if there are non-linear terms
and if they have the magnitude proposed by Bialynicki-Birula and Mycielski. A later
experiment performed on these outlines seems to exclude [see Shull et al. 1980] such terms.
Obviously this does not mean that the methods of quantum mechanics and chaos theory
cannot be combined. They can be, and are in fact unified in what is now known as  ‘quantum
chaos’.
26 There exists a  lot of literature on this subject. For a summary see chapters 31 and 34-35 of
Auletta 2000.
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2.4 Reductionism
We may now summarize the results of this section by saying that materialism plus linearity
plus separability are sufficient and necessary conditions for reductionism. In fact, there can
only be reduction of inert matter, this reduction is possible only if the elements are linearly
combined and the equations ruling the behaviour of the system are themselves linear, and if
there is a possibility of factorisation, i.e. if there is no entanglement such that the system is
correlated with other systems. Roughly speaking, by reductionism27 it is usually meant that a
system is given as the ‘sum’ of its constituent components or, equivalently, that any system
can be divided into “elementary” parts. In other words, the reductionistic methodology of CM
can be defined as the idea that elementary bodies can be linearly added to form compound
systems, and both the elements and the resulting systems are separable. Thus, the aim of
reductionism is to find the ultimate elements of matter that cannot be further reduced. To our
knowledge there is no certainty (and there are even doubts) that such a task will ever be
accomplished. One speaks today, for example, of quarks and leptons as `divisible' particles.
However, quantum mechanics violates this type of reductionism because it violates the
separability principle and does not, as we have seen, violate linearity (leaving aside the
problem of materialism). In fact, it is evident that, if separability is violated, no reduction of a
whole to ‘parts’ is possible because the parts could be not treated as independent systems (and
therefore disentangled).
The theory of complexity also violates a reductionistic methodology: In this case. as we have
seen, by rejecting linearity. Feedback assures that in this case the connection between several
parts can be more than their sum. Furthermore, after having divided a complex system, there
is no guarantee that we can reconstruct it by simply adding or bounding the parts.
On the other hand, reductionism can also be understood to be the reduction of more complex
theories and sciences such as chemistry and biology to physics and especially to quantum
mechanics (this may be called epistemological or methodological reductionism relative to the
first type, which may be called ontological reductionism). It is true that quantum mechanics
also shows its effects (entanglement, for example) at mesoscopic level. But this does not
mean that the mesoscopic or the macroscopic world are only ‘illusions’ - apparent realities. In
fact, the process of decoherence and of localization, in particular, which goes together with
decoherence, especially when the number and the complexity of systems exponentially grows,
is objective throughout28. On the other hand, no necessity arises to conceive methodological
reductionism as being a one-way operation: If one speaks of reduction to more elementary
objects, one should speak - with more reason - of a methodological reduction of microscopic
equations for the constituents of a system (via coarse graining) to differential equations for
macroscopic variables, and from these (via numerical calculations of Poincaré sections) to
low dimensional Poincaré maps29.
Reductionism was almost universally applied in modern science30 until the 1960s and was
also used by many modern philosophers. An extreme form of reductionism can be found in
Spinoza, since he wrote [1677: 99-100] that the unity of a body only consists of a coordinate
motion of the parts: When elements go in different directions the body is destroyed.
                                                 
27 See Primas 1993.
28 See chapters 17 and 24-25 of Auletta 2000. This is exactly the problem faced by quantum
computation.
29 See Schuster 1988 [14-16] and Bergé et al. 1984 [63-78].
30 For instance, to human behavior [see Skinner 1974].
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3. Mechanism
Sufficient and necessary conditions for mechanism are determinism and reductionism.
Classical mechanics is essentially built on these two requirements and supposes, therefore,
mechanism. It is even difficult to conceive a form of `classical' mechanics that could violate
one or the other assumption. In fact, a form of mechanics is supposed to consist in the theory
that, given an input (some force), we have a fully automatic and proportional output (some
acceleration), which surely would be impossible if the whole system were more than the sum
of the `parts' (i.e. if the requirement of reductionism were violated), or if it showed a random
reaction to a given action (i.e. if the requirement of determinism were violated). On the other
hand, a system satisfying the features of determinism and reductionism would be necessarily
mechanical. For instance, we distinguish the behaviour of organic life from pure mechanical
behaviour precisely through the violation of one or the other requirement or of both31.
4. Completeness
The possibility of a complete knowledge in the frame of CM is dependent on two
assumptions, namely determinism and isolability. Firstly, let us examine the assumption of
isolability.
4.1 Isolability
CM assumes that isolated systems are possible; i.e. that we can always theoretically treat and
experimentally (at least in principle) generate a system without physical interdependence with
other systems or with the environment. It is the isolability which guarantees conservation laws
of pertinent quantities. In fact angular momentum, energy or motion can be conserved only if
the system is considered as isolated from others, i.e. there is no interaction so as to cause
dispersion or no action of an external force so as to change its motion. Quantum mechanics
does not apparently violate this assumption. However, since in quantum mechanics
measurement is the only means, for example, to acquire information about the position of a
system, it can be questioned if one can speak reasonably of a quantum isolated system [see
Bohr 1928: 586]. Finally, it may also be asked if fully isolated quantum-mechanical or
macroscopic systems exist.
4.2 Completeness
In CM it is supposed that one can perfectly know (at least in principle) all the properties of a
given system. In other words, the properties of the object system can be perfectly measured.
Therefore, it is postulated that the measurement errors can be - at least in principle - always
reduced below an arbitrarily small quantity. Hence this assumption may be called the
postulate of reduction to zero of the measurement error.
Note that this postulate is not a direct consequence of the principle of perfect determination
alone, because it can happen that a system is objectively, but not subjectively, perfectly
determined. It presupposes continuity too: In fact, if the pertinent variables were
discontinuous, then we could not approximate the measurement outcome to a point-like value
in a given interval. Hence it presupposes determinism (which, as we know, presupposes
perfect determination plus continuity). But isolability too: In fact, if the system could not be
really isolated, we could never know its properties perfectly, not even in a very large time
                                                 
31 See Langton 1989a-b.
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interval, because, during the flow of time, it may be that small interactions with external
systems cause small uncertainties in the measurement results so that - even if these
uncertainties do not cumulate or amplificate - one cannot go beyond a certain threshold.
If we speak of the perfect knowledge of all properties of a given system at the same time, then
this assumption is obviously violated in quantum mechanics through the uncertainty principle.
In fact, this principle states that, by increasing the knowledge or the determination of an
observable of a conjugate pair, the complementary observable must proportionally increase its
uncertainty. It can also be asked if there are ultimate limits to our knowledge of the
microworld, in the sense that, by increasing the precision of our analysis, we will get to a
point where the noise produced by our apparata is sufficient to cover useful information.
Furthermore, it was recently shown [Landsberg 1988] that, to a certain extent, one could also
speak of uncertainties in CM. In fact, in classical mechanics position and velocity are treated
on the same footing, so that both can have determined values at the same time. However, it is
dubious that one can measure the velocity of a particle at a given point with infinite precision.
It can only be said that it has a determined velocity in a small space interval, but it is surely
conceptually erroneous to assign both a perfectly determined velocity and a perfectly
determined position to it. Landsberg showed that it is possible to deduce some uncertainty
relations, also in the classical case, by means of a concrete example.
5. Classical Mechanics
We can now draw the first general conclusion from the above analysis: CM consists of both
mechanism and completeness (of knowledge). There is no doubt that there can be no CM
without mechanism. But one may think that completeness is not a necessary condition of CM.
It is a fact that CM is so built that a perfect transparency of the object system to the
knowledge corresponds to the perfect ontological determination of it. But, in a certain sense,
it could also not be otherwise: For a physicist the primary questions are objective and not
subjective: In order to admit to having an incomplete knowledge together with the assumption
of mechanism - and hence of a perfect ontological determination - one should know some
basic limitations of the human mind, which, in principle, exclude the possibility for human
beings to perfectly know systems that are objectively perfectly determined.
6. Classical Epistemology
Classical mechanics has been developed together with what may be called classical
epistemology - i. e. the epistemology which is common to Galilei, Spinoza, Newton, Kant (in
the Critics of Pure Reason), Einstein and many others – we do not take here into
consideration the important differences that exist among these authors. Modern classical
epistemology certainly presupposes the completeness of knowledge, i.e. that the properties of
being can be perfectly known, but it also supposes what may be called a `mirroring' theory32
(representationalism). Explicitly: Classical epistemology considers the act of knowledge as a
mirroring of the properties of the object. In other words, knowledge is understood to be a
reproduction of objective and given data and not a form of interaction between subject and
object. This understanding of knowledge is very ancient and can also be seen in the works of
Plato. Several philosophical schools have shared this point of view. Obviously, there is no
agreement between the several schools about what the being to be reproduced is (ideas like
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platonic substances, atoms, forms, material objects, and so on). When knowledge is so
understood, then one assigns a mere reproductive and representative role to the subject.
However, this view is not so evident and presents several difficulties [see Auletta 2002a-b].
For this reason pragmatism33 proposes a different theory of knowledge. It is seen as a
problems-solving enterprise, which, by starting with a problem, assumes a hypothesis (out of
many other possible ones) because it can solve the conflicts or the contradictions arisen from
the problem itself in a satisfactory manner. This is not the place for examining this subject in
detail, but I think that this explanation of how theories work and are generated is far more
satisfactory for describing scientific knowledge than the traditional, classical approach. I only
wish to stress the following aspects of this explanation:
1. Subject and object are not understood as static beings and knowledge not as a form of
translation of data into a mind (and how would it be possible?).
2. Experience is dynamic and comprehends `subject' and `object'34.
3. Knowledge is open and never represents a final answer.
4. Knowledge is a form of praxis and the theory is not completely separated from other
human activities.
Also in Artificial Intelligence (in the last years) and in Artificial Life the operative feature of
intelligence has been stressed against the traditionally representational view [see Brooks
1990, 1991; Clark 1997].
7. Modern Classical Philosophy
It is possible, in analogy with the previous definitions, to call the main stream in the 17th to
18th centuries modern  classical philosophy (i.e. a compound of CM plus classical
epistemology). The fact that philosophers and physicists of that age have acknowledged all or
almost all the above principles can be seen from the following examples.
Let us first take Kant's criticism of the ontological proof of the existence of God [B: 627].
Kant says that when I affirm that God exists, I add no new predicate to the concept of God;
rather I pose only the subject (God) in itself with all its predicates, i.e. the object in
relationship to my concept. Both, the object and the concept, must have the same content. In
other words, in the terminology that Kant uses here, what is real does not contain something
more than what is only possible (the concept). If the object could contain more than the
concept, then the latter would not express the whole object and would therefore not be
adequate to this object (it is an evident requirement of the completeness of concepts). So far
Kant. In this argumentation, the ominimoda determinatio is always taken for granted and
three additional principles are (implicitly) assumed: (1) The concept is isomorphic with the
object (the predicates contained in the concept correspond to properties that the object has: It
is the mirroring theory); (2) therefore an adequate knowledge must be complete (all properties
of the object must be considered in the concept); and (3) finally one can consider the object
`in itself', i.e. in complete isolation from other objects (it is the assumption of isolation). Since
this is a general argument that goes beyond the specific problem of the existence of God, one
can consider any object without a relationship with the other objects of the universe. It is true
that elsewhere [B: 599-602] one speaks of the omnimoda determinatio as an ideal, but in the
above example it is taken as an ontological fact.
To my knowledge, Kant never rejected continuity and perhaps he had nothing against
linearity. He surely assumed a form of materialism: Since our knowledge can only happen in
                                                 
33 On this point see Peirce 1878a-b.
34 On this point see Dewey 1929.
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an experience which is intrinsic spatial-temporal [B, 33-73], then the objects of knowledge
can only be bodies; and in fact, as it is well known, Kant excludes that the subject of
knowledge can also be the object of knowledge [B: 152-165]. In his first writings he also used
a form of the principle of separability [1756: 477]: Composed objects should be separable in
elements that can exist separately. Then he essentially acknowledged all the above principles.
Now let us also briefly discuss the assumptions (but not the details of the argumentation) of
the article by Einstein et al. [1935]. There is no doubt that it acknowledges the omnimoda
determinatio. In fact, the aim of the article is to show that there can be elements of reality
which cannot be represented in quantum mechanics due to its uncertainty principle - in fact, it
is well known that Einstein thought quantum mechanics could only represent a statistical (and
therefore incomplete) theory of microentities. Specifically, the aim of the article is to show
that quantum mechanics violates a sufficient condition of reality, which may be expressed as
follows: If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict the value of a physical
quantity with probability equal to unity, then there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity. It is evident that two things are supposed here: First,
reality is perfectly determined in itself; second, that one can also know it perfectly (my
completeness condition). Continuity is evidently acknowledged in the formal development of
the argument itself. So there is no doubt that the article also acknowledged determinism (=
omnimoda determinatio + continuity). Though no word is said about materialism and
linearity, the core of the article is represented by a strong defence of the principle of
separability (here for the first time formulated), so that one can suppose that reductionism was
also a valid assumption for Einstein and his co-workers.
But their article goes even further. In fact, two definitions are formulated with great emphasis
at the beginning: Those of correctness and completeness. It is said that a theory is totally
correct if every element of the theory has a counterpart in reality: In other words, a totally
correct theory is one without superfluous theoretical terms. It is evident that the necessary
condition for assuming this definition is the mirroring theory: If theories could not mirror
reality, they could also not mirror reality correctly. As regards completeness it is said that a
theory is complete if every element of reality has a counterpart in it - it is evident that
correctness together with completeness establish an equivalence relationship between
physical theory and reality. This definition of the completeness of a theory is much stronger
than the one previously formulated. In conclusion CM and classical epistemology, and
therefore classical philosophy as such, are defended in Einstein's article.
It is very interesting that Kant and Einstein - both scientists and philosophers - essentially
defend the body of modern classical philosophy, and that the latter does it in open conflict
with quantum mechanics.
8. Conclusions
For three centuries CM has been the model of what Science is and should be. Therefore, it is a
little surprising that its basic assumptions were assumed without critical examination. But two
points are very important here:
1. Without quantum mechanics and its consequences nobody would have perceived the
problems hidden in assumptions that ultimately stem from common sense or from a
refinement of our ordinary experience regarding macroscopic objects. This does not
mean that this experience is in itself wrong at all. We live and act in a macroscopic
world where the struggle for life is the most important thing and for this practical
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purpose it makes no sense - and it is perhaps even dangerous - to assume, for instance,
that objects are not perfectly determined or fuzzy35.
2. But neither are CM's assumptions wrong as such. CM has been and is in fact a
powerful tool in order to explore nature and establish some basic features of the
physical world. Stated in other terms, taking into account all that was known at that
time, CM worked - and still works - very well. The only thing that is wrong is the
supposition that CM's assumptions and laws are objective in the sense that they mirror
what Nature is in itself. In other words, what was and is wrong about CM is a
`mirroring' epistemology and an epistemology which has produced an absolutization
of this physical theory. Therefore, here we have a confirmation e contrario of the
rightness of the point of view of pragmatism.
As a conclusion are we forced to assume an idealistic or subjectivistic point of view? Not
necessarily. In quantum mechanics it is impossible to conceive the properties as being
intrinsic. But they can be understood to be relational very well, in particular as being relative
to the interactions a given system has or may have with other systems (not necessarily
apparata). It is therefore a non-classical form of realism36.
Acknowledgments
This article originates from a synthesis of several lessons about Classical Mechanics and
discussions with my students at the Institute of Philosphy of the University of Urbino and at
the Gregoriana University in Rome.
The present article owes very much to Prof. Giorgio Parisi whose deep insights were
especially enlightening for me. I also thank Prof. Marcello Cini, Prof. Vincenzo Fano, Dr.
Mauro Fortunato, Dr. Valeria Mosini who read the manuscript and gave me plenty of
suggestions.
Bibliography
Arnold, Vladimir I. 1978 Mathematical Methods of Classical Mechanics (tr. from
russ.), New York, Springer, 1978; 2nd ed.: 1989
Auletta, Gennaro 2000 Foundations and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics  in the
Light of a Critical-Historical Analysis of the Problems and of a Synthesis of the
Results, Singapore, World Scientific
- 2002a “Some Lessons of Quantum Mechanics for Cognitive Sciences”, in press
- 2002b  , "Is Representation Characterized by Intrinsicity and Causality?", in
press
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, 1739 Metaphysica, 1739; VII ed., Halle 1779; rep.
Hildesheim-New York, Georg Olms, 1982
                                                 
35 And, with a high probability, macroscopic objects are also partly fuzzy; in fact one has
shown theoretically and finally experimentally that, at mesoscopic level, `Schrödinger cats'
are possible [see Brune et al. 1996 and Monroe et al. 1996].
36 On the problem of realism see van der Merwe et al. 1988 and Auletta 2000![795-800].
15
Bergé, P./Pomeau, Y./Vidal, C. 1984 Order Within Chaos. Towards a Deterministic
Approach to Turbulence, New York-Paris, J. Wiley-Hermann
Bialynicki-Birula, I./Mycielski, J. 1976 “Nonlinear Wave Mechanics”, Annals of
Physics 100: 62--93
Bohr, Niels 1913 “On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules”, Philosophical
Magazine 26: 1-25, 476-502, 857-75
- 1928 “The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic
Theory”, Nature 121: 580-90
- 1929 “Wirkungsquantum und Naturbeschreibung”, Die Naturwissenschaften
17: 483-86
Brooks, Rodney A. 1990 "Elephants Don't Play Chess", Robotics and Autonomous
Systems 6: 3-15
- 1991 ``Intelligence without Representation'', Artificial Intelligence 47: 139-60
Brune, M./Hagley, E./Dreyer, J./Maître, X./Maali, A./Wunderlich, C./Raimond, J.
M./Haroche, S. 1996 “Observing the Progressive Decoherence of the `Meter' in a
Quantum Measurement”, Physical Review Letters 77: 4887-90
Carmichael, Howard J. 1993 An Open Systems Approach to Quantum Optics,
Heidelberg, Springer
Cartwright, Nancy 1999 The Dappled World. A Study of the Boundaries of Science,
Cambridge, University Press
Cassirer, Ernst 1906 Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der
neueren Zeit, 1906, II ed. 1911, III ed. 1922; Hildesheim, Olms, 1971 (IV vols.)
- 1957 Zur modernen Physik, 1957, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1994
Clark, Andy 1997 Being There. Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again,
Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1997; II print. 1997
Dewey, John 1929 Experience and Nature, 1929; New York, Dover, 1958
Earman, John 1986 A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht, Reidel
Einstein, A./Podolsky, B./Rosen N. 1935 “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of
Physical Reality be Considered Complete?”: Physical Review 47: 777-80
Elitzur, A. C./Vaidman, L. 1993 “Quantum Mechanical Interaction-Free
Measurements”, Foundations of Physics 23: 987-97
Goldstein, Herbert 1950 Classical Mechanics, Massachussets, Addison-Wesley, 1950,
1965
Hall, A. Rupert 1954 The Revolution in Science. 1500-1750, London, Longman, 1954,
II ed. 1962, 1983, 1989
16
Hardegree, Gary M. 1979 “The Conditional in Abstract and Concrete Quantum
Logic”, in HOOKER, C. A. (ed.), The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quantum
Mechanics. Contemporary Consolidation, Dordrecht, Reidel: 49-108
Hestenes, David 1986 New Foundations of Classical Mechanics, Dordrecht, Kluwer,
1986, 1987, 1990, 1993; II ed.: 1999
Kant, Immanuel A Kants Werke. Akademie Textausgabe, Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1968
- 1756 Metaphysic\ae cum geometria iunct\ae usus in philosophia naturali; in A:
I, 473-88
- 1763 Der einzige ögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins
Gottes; in A: II, 63-164
- B Kritik der reinen Vernunft, II ed. 1787: III v. of A
Knudsen, J. M./Hjorth, P. G. 1995 Elements of Newtonian Mechanics, Berlin,
Springer, 1995; II ed: 1996; III ed.: 2000
 Koyré, Alexandre 1957 From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, Baltimore,
John Hopkins Press
- 1966 Etudes galiléennes, Paris, Hermann, 1966, 1980
- 1968 Etudes newtoniéennes, Paris, Gallimard
Landau, Lev D./Lifshitz, E. M. 1976 Mechanics (eng. tr.), I vol. of The Course of
Theoretical Physics,  Oxford, Pergamon
Landsberg, P. T. 1988 “Why Quantum Mechancis?”, Foundations of Physics 18: 969-
82
Langton, Christopher G. (ed.) 1989a Artificial Life: Proceedings of an
Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems,
Redwood City, Addison-Wesley
- 1989b “Artificial Life”, in Langton 1989a; updated in L. Nadel/D. Stein (eds.),
1991 Lectures in Complex Systems, Redwood City, Addison-Wesley, 1992: 189-
-241
Leibniz, Gottfried W. PS  Philosophische Scriften (ed. Gerhardt), Halle, 1875; rep.
Hildesheim, Olms, 1978
- MS  Mathematische Scriften (ed. Gerhardt), Halle, 1860; rep. Hildesheim,
Olms, 1971
Mach, Ernst 1883 Die Mechanik in Ihrer Entwicklung. Historisch-kritisch dargestellt,
Leipzig, 1883, IX ed. Leipzig 1933; Darmstadt, WBG, 1991
- 1905 Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 1905, II ed. 1906, V ed.  Leipzig, 1926,
Darmstadt, WBG, 1991
Monroe, C./Meekhof, D. M./King, B. E./Wineland, D. J. 1996 “A `Schrödinger Cat'
Superposition State of an Atom”, Science 272: 1131--36
17
Newton, Isaac 1687 Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, London, 1687;
Cambridge, 1713; London, 1726; Harward (edited by Koyré/Cohen), University
Press, 1972
- 1704 Opticks or A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections and
Colours of Light, 1704 (I ed.), 1706 (II ed., lat.), 1721 (III ed.), London, 1730
(IV ed.); New York, Dover, 1952, 1979
Peirce, Charles S. W Writings, Bloomington, Indiana Univeristy Press, 1986 and fs.
- 1878a How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, Popular Science Monthly 12: 286-302;
in W: III, 257-76
- 1878b “Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis”, Popular Science Monthly 13:
470-82; in W: III, 323-38
Planck, Max 1900a “Über die Verbesserung der Wien'schen Spektralgleichung”,
Verhandlungen der Deutchen Physikalischen Gesellschaft 2: 202-204
- 1900b “Zur Theorie des Gesetzes der Energieverteilung im Normalspektrum”,
Verhandlungen der Deutchen Physikalischen Gesellschaft 2: 237-45
Primas, Hans 1993 Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism, Berlin,
Springer
Redhead, Michael 1987 Incompletness, Nonlocality and Realism, Oxford, Clarendon,
1987, 1992
Rorty, Richard 1980 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, University Press,
1980; Oxford, Blackwell, 1980, 1990
Reichenbach, Hans 1924 “Die Bewegungslehre bei Newton, Leibniz und Huygens”,
Kantstudien 29: 416--38
Ruelle, David 1989 Chaotic Evolution and Strange Attractors, Cambridge, U. P.,
1989, 1990, 1992
Schuster, Heinz Georg 1988 Deterministic Chaos. An Introduction, Weinheim, VCH,
II ed. 1988, 1989
Shimony, Abner 1979 “Proposed Neutron Interferometer Test of Some Non-linear
Variants of Wave Mechanics”, Physical Review A20: 394--96
Shull, C. G./Atwood, D. K./Arthur, J./Horne, M. A. 1980 “Search For a Nonlinear
Variant of the Schrödinger Equation by Neutron Interferometry”, Physical
Review Letters 44: 765—68
Skinner, Burrhus F. 1974 About Behaviorism, New York, Random House
Spinoza, Baruch O Opera  (ed. C. Gebhardt), 4 vols., Heidelberg 1925, rep.
Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1972
Spinoza, Baruch 1677 Ethica, Amsterdam 1677; in O: II, 41-308
18
Swinburne, Richard (ed.) 1983 Space, Time and Causality, Reidel, Dordrecht
Tarozzi, Gino 1993 “On the Different Forms of Quantum Acausality”, in C. Garola/A.
Rossi (eds.), The Foundations of  Quantum Mechanics: Historical Analysis and
Open Questions, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996: 435-47
- 1996 “Quantum Measurements and Macroscopical Reality: Epistemological
Implications of a Proposed Paradox”, Foundations of Physics 26: 907-917
Thompson, D'Arcy  W. 1942 On Growth and Form, 1942; Cambridge, University
Press, 1961, 1966, 1992, 2000
van Der Merwe, A./Selleri, F./Tarozzi, G. (eds.) 1988 Microphysical Reality and
Quantum Formalism, I, Dordrecht, Kluwer
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1989 Laws and Symmetry, Oxford, Clarendon
Wolff, Christian 1730 Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, Frankfurt a. M. 1730; 2d ed.
1736; rep. GW: II.3
- GW Gesammelte Werke (ed. J. Ecole), Hildesheim, Olms, 1964 and fs.
Titolo: Esame critico dei fondamenti della meccanica classica alla luce della fisica
quantistica.
Abstract: Com'è noto, la meccanica classica è caratterizzata per il fatto di essere una
teoria determinista, riduzionistica e meccanicista. Tutte e tre le assunzioni discendono
a loro volta da principi o postulati più fondamentali. In particolare il determinismo è
una conseguenza del principio di perfetta determinazione dei sistemi fisici e del
principio di continuità, mentre il riduzionismo è basato su un assunto materialistico
congiuntamente ai principi di linearità e separabilità. Infine il meccanicismo è prodotto
dalla congiunzione del determinismo e del riduzionismo. La meccanica classica, intesa
qui come l’edificio storicamente prodotto tra gli inizi del XVII secolo e la fine del
XIX, oltre al meccanicismo, assume un principio di perfetta conoscibilità dei sistemi
fisici.
Nell’articolo si intende mostrare che, sebbene tali assunzioni siano state
universalmente accettate fino all'inizio del XX secolo, non sono affatto così ovvie. In
particolare, il fatto che questi principi e assunzioni, in un modo o nell’altro, non
trovino applicazione in  meccanica quantistica o addirittura siano violati da questa
disciplina, mostra la loro limitatezza ‘regionale’. Pertanto si tratta, in genere, di
assunzioni che derivano da una generalizzazione del nostro senso comune o almeno
della nostra esperienza ordinaria con corpi macroscopici. Tuttavia l'errore non risiede
tanto nelle assunzioni come tali, che erano e restano operativamente efficaci, quanto
piuttosto nell'assolutizzazione epistemologica della teoria che ne ha fatto, da un mezzo
di indagine sul mondo fisico, un riflesso della Natura come tale.
